Selected Labor & Employment
Updates
compiled by Book Review/Updates Editor
This section of the Journalprovides notes on recent cases, pending or
newly enacted legislation, and other current legal materials. The Updates
section is designed to aid the practitioner in relating the Journal articles to
the daily practice of labor and employment law. The Journal welcomes
outside submissions of brief judicial and legislative summaries.
First Circuit holds that alcoholic was not "disabled" under the ADA.
Bailey v. GeorgiaPacific Corp, 306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
Bailey was an alcoholic. While he was generally able to fulfill his
employment responsibilities, he was sometimes unable to take extra shifts
because he had been drinking. He had several convictions for driving
while intoxicated and was ultimately sentenced to four months of
incarceration. His employer denied his request to supervise him on a work
release program, and after his vacation and sick leave had expired, he was
terminated for not being available to work.
Bailey alleged a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer and
the First Circuit affirmed.
The Court applied a three-step analysis to conclude that Bailey was
not disabled under the ADA. (1) There must be an impairment and
alcoholism is such an impairment. (2) Bailey must identify a "major life
activity," and he alleged that his alcoholism substantially limited the major
life activity of "working." (3) The impairment must "substantially limit"
the major life activity. This requires a "weighty showing" the he is
"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities." The Court concluded that
Bailey had presented evidence that his difficulties were only at one job, and
were "isolated and, for the most part, not momentous." His incarceration
was only short-term was also not a substantial limitation.
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Third Circuit holds that a statement by supervisor that he was
"looking for younger people" is direct evidence of age discrimination
sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, and allow a
jury to find that the decision makers placed substantial negative reliance
on the plaintiffs age in reaching their decision to fire him. Fakete v. Aetna,
Inc., 308 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2002).
After a reorganization of the audit department, Fakete, a 56 year old
audit consultant was told by his supervisor the company was "looking for
younger single people that will work unlimited hours and that [he]
wouldn't be happy there in the future." Fakete was issued a warning and
then discharged five months later, just three months before his pension
vested. The employer claimed the discharge was because he violated the
terms of the warning, falsified expense reports and failed to pay for
personal phone calls. Fakete alleged age discrimination. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary
judgment to the employer.
The Third Circuit analyzed the case a "direct evidence" case under
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Under the Price
Waterhouse standard, "direct evidence" that age was a substantial factor in
an employment decision shifts the burden to the employer to prove that it
would have discharged the plaintiff without consideration of age. The
Court rejected the trial court's portrayal of the supervisor's statement as "a
stray remark that did not directly reflect the decisionmaking process of any
particular employment decision," reversed the summary judgment order
and remanded the case.
Fifth Circuit holds that an unincorporatedbusiness wholly owned by
the Choctaw nation, was exempt from Title VIi's definition of "employer."
Thomas v. Choctaw Management, 313 F.3d 910 (5th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff husband and wife employees brought an action pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq., 42
U.S.C.S. § 1981, and state law against defendant employer and supervisor
alleging religion and pregnancy discrimination. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the action and plaintiffs
appealed the Title VII claims only.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq.,
states unequivocally that the term "employer" does not include, an Indian
tribe. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e(b). The Court rejected the argument that
Choctaw Management is a legal entity separate from the tribe, finding that
the employer "is not a corporation at all and is, in fact, a direct proprietary
enterprise of the Choctaw Nation." 313 F. 3d at 910.
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Fifth Circuit holds that Federal employee, who abandoned EEOC
appeal after employer failed to take timely action on Title VII complaint,
exhausted administrative remedies. Martinez v. Dept. of U.S. Army, No.
02-50765, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 942 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2003).
A federal employee sued his employer, Department of the United
States Army alleging race and gender discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq. The United
States District Court For the Western District of Texas granted the
employer's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The employee appealed.
Albert C. Martinez (Martinez) filed a formal complaint for
discrimination based on race and gender regarding his non-selection for
promotion with the Department of the United States Army. Several months
later Martinez filed a second formal complaint alleging harassment based
on reprisal for filing his first complaint. The Army issued a report of its
investigations into both of Martinez' complaints after the first complaint's
180-day deadline expired but before the second complaint's 180-day
deadline expired. The Army did not otherwise enter a final decision.
Martinez timely appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) for review. Before the administrative law judge heard
the employee's appeal, he abandoned his administrative appeal and
subsequently filed suit in federal court.
The Fifth Circuit held that for the purposes of the failure-to-exhaust
inquiry, where a case languishes in the administrative phase beyond the
180 day deadline, the court cannot say that abandoning the administrative
process constitutes such a lack of cooperation as to bar suit by reason of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
D.C. Circuit holds that the National Labor Relations Board failed to
provide sufficient reasoning to support its conclusion that contractor's
employees had NLRA Section 7 rights to distribute handbills. New York
New York v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
The owner, New York New York (NYNY) leased space in its casino
complex to an independent contractor, Ark, who operated food service
facilities. When some of the contractors' employees engaged in union
organizing activity, the owner had the contractor's employees cited and
removed as trespassers. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
found that the employer's actions violated Section (8)(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether the employees of a

